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INTRODUCTION

For many prisoners there is no greater fear, and perhaps there is no
greater injustice, than serving a prison sentence beyond that authorized by law.
At sentencing, a prisoner's sentence may be enhanced by two different
mechanisms: the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("USSG") and the
Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). The USSG imposes a sentence
enhancement if a prisoner has committed a violent felony and has at least two
prior felony convictions or controlled substance offenses.' The ACCA imposes
a sentence enhancement if a prisoner has committed a felony weapons crime
and also has at least three prior violent felony convictions. 2 A recent case
decided by the United States Supreme Court, Begay v. United States,3 narrowed
the definition of "violent felony" under these two sentencing enhancement
mechanisms.4 Because of this reinterpretation, crimes once considered to be
"violent felonies" are no longer, and should have never been, classified as
such.5 Accordingly, many prisoners sentenced pre-Begay were incorrectly
determined to have committed violent felonies under the USSG or the ACCA
and received the correlating sentence enhancement for crimes that the Supreme
Court subsequently determined to be non-violent felonies. Consequently, many
federal prisoners' sentences were erroneously enhanced-their sentences were
increased above the maximum sentence they would have otherwise received
had the erroneous enhancement not been applied.
In the wake of Begay, a number of federal prisoners have filed motions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to correct their
allegedly erroneous sentences.6 To successfully obtain collateral relief through

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
2

§

4B1.1 (2012).

18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).

553 U.S. 137 (2008).
Id. at 142-43. Begay dealt solely with the Armed Career Criminal Act, but its holding also
applies to "violent felonies" under the United States Sentencing Guidelines because the language
is identical. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
s
Begay has been interpreted to be retroactive. See infra note 34.
6
See, e.g., Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Sun Bear
v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 2011); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293,
4
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§ 2255 or § 2241, the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner must show that
the sentencing error is "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice."7 This standard is met if the prisoner shows
that he is "actually innocent."
Circuits are split as to whether a prisoner can be "actually innocent" of
his erroneously enhanced sentence. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
have concluded that "actual innocence" cannot be used to attack a sentence; it
can be used to attack the underlying crime of conviction only. 9 Recently, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested for the first
time that the "actual innocence" exception applies to sentences, in certain
circumstances. o
To better understand the seriousness of the distinction, consider an
illustration:
You were convicted in either the Eighth or Eleventh Circuit of
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in 2000. For that offense
alone, you faced a sentence of 151 to 188 months imprisonment. However, you
had two prior felony convictions: attempted burglary and carrying a concealed
weapon. The sentencing judge determined that both of these prior felony
convictions were considered "violent felonies" under Eight Circuit law at the
time of your sentencing, which means that you were eligible to receive a career
offender enhancement to your sentencing range. Based on this sentence
enhancement, you faced an increased sentencing range of 292 to 365 months;
the sentencing judge sentenced you to 292 months.
You then challenged your sentence on direct appeal, which was denied.
You next collaterally attacked your sentence using 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a),
arguing that the sentencing judge incorrectly determined that your prior felony
convictions were "violent felonies" under Eighth Circuit law. Thus, you
argued, you should not have received the enhanced sentencing range. Your §
2255 motion was then denied by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals because it
concluded that the sentencing judge correctly determined that your prior felony
convictions were considered "violent felonies" that warranted the career
offender enhancement.

1302 (11th Cir. 2011). The differences between 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 are
discussed in Part Ill.
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States 368
7
U.S. 424,428 (1962)).
8
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (finding that the miscarriage of justice
exception applies when a petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of which he was convicted
or the penalty which was imposed).
9
See infra Parts IV.B.2, IV.C.2.
to
See infra Part V.A.
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Eight years go by, and the Supreme Court decides a case called Begay
v. United States, in which it holds that your two prior felony convictions are
not, and should never have been, considered "violent felonies." Therefore, the
sentencing judge made a mistake and you should never have received the
sentence enhancement. The maximum sentence that you should have received
was 188 months, but you are stuck with your 292-month sentence.
Your only avenue of relief is to file a habeas corpus petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. You successfully file your petition in federal court and argue
that under the newly decided Supreme Court decision, you should never have
been subject to the career offender enhancement and therefore the sentencing
judge erroneously calculated your sentence. Thus, you claim that the
miscalculation of your sentence is a miscarriage of justice, and you are
"actually innocent" of your erroneous sentence.
The Eighth Circuit agrees that under the Supreme Court decision, your
prior felony convictions are no longer, and should have never been, considered
crimes of violence. The court also agrees that your sentence was miscalculated,
and that you received a sentence far beyond the maximum that you would have
otherwise received without the career offender enhancement. Nonetheless, the
court determines that you cannot be actually innocent of a sentence; you can
only be actually innocent of your underlying crime of conviction. And because
you are not alleging innocence of a crime (only that your sentence was
erroneously calculated), you cannot be resentenced.
And imagine that a prisoner in the Seventh Circuit was convicted for
the exact same crime for which you were convicted, was sentenced at the exact
same time, and had the exact same prior felony convictions that you had. And
imagine that the Seventh Circuit prisoner took the exact same steps to obtain
post-conviction relief that you took: his direct appeal was denied and he was
forced to file for § 2241 relief after his § 2255 motion was denied. This
prisoner argued that he is "actually innocent" of his erroneously enhanced
sentence based on Begay's reinterpretation of a "violent felony." However, the
Seventh Circuit agrees that a prisoner can be "actually innocent" of his
sentence, and agrees to resentence this prisoner. So, you are serving the
remainder of your erroneous 292-month sentence in a federal prison while the
Seventh Circuit prisoner gets to go free.
This Note will argue that the Seventh Circuit's approach should be
adopted because it would eliminate the arbitrary distinction between innocence
of a sentence and innocence of a crime for purposes of "actual innocence," and
would allow all prisoners with illegal sentences to be resentenced. This
approach would not destroy the finality interests of habeas corpus, nor would it
open the floodgates to endless habeas corpus filings. Rather, the Seventh
Circuit's approach is a narrow exception that would provide relief only to those
prisoners who truly deserve it.
Part II provides background on two vehicles by which a federal
prisoner's sentence can be enhanced: the USSG or the ACCA. Next, Part II
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analyzes how Begay reinterpreted the ACCA and USSG, which left many
prisoners with clearly erroneous sentences ("Begay-type" sentences)."
Part III examines the avenues of relief available to prisoners with
Begay-type sentences: 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This Part will
explain the procedural obstacles through which a prisoner must pass to file a
cognizable § 2255 motion, and the "actual innocence" exception that would
allow an otherwise procedurally disqualified prisoner to file a cognizable
Begay-type sentencing claim.
Part IV discusses the current view of the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
on the scope of "actual innocence." Part IV first discusses the case on which
these circuits rely for their jurisprudence on this issue: In re Davenport.12 Next,
Part IV analyzes the decisions from these circuits with an emphasis on their
reliance on Davenport as well as cases with identical holdings as Davenport.
Part V argues that the current majority interpretation of "actual
innocence" should be reexamined. Part V.A discusses a recent case decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Narvaez v. United
States,13 that may have reinterpreted Davenport by extending the scope of the
"actual innocence" exception to USSG sentencing errors. Part V.B discusses a
subsequent Seventh Circuit case, Hawkins v. United States,14 that narrowed the
Narvaez holding. Part V.C argues that, in light of Narvaez, other circuits
relying on Davenport or cases with identical holdings should reexamine their
jurisprudence on the scope of "actual innocence." Finally, Part V.D argues that
the holding of Narvaez-a USSG case-should extend to erroneously
enhanced ACCA sentences because ACCA sentences present a stronger ground
for claims of "actual innocence."
Finally, Part VI argues that the holding of Narvaez should be
universally adopted. The Seventh Circuit's approach would provide relief to all
types of innocence: prisoners who are innocent of their sentences and prisoners
who are innocent of their underlying crime of conviction. This part will rebut
the arguments-advanced by Eighth and Eleventh Circuits-that extending the
scope of "actual innocence" to sentencing claims will destroy the finality
interest of habeas corpus and would open the floodgates to endless filing of
habeas corpus petitions. 5 Narvaez is a narrow exception that would provide
relief to prisoners who deserve to be resentenced.

1 The terms "Begay-type sentences" and "Begay-type errors" are taken from Sarah French
Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV.
79, 85 (2012).
12
147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998).
674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011).
706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013).
15 See Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2011); Gilbert v. United States,
640 F.3d 1293, 1311 (1Ith Cir. 2011).
'

14
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In sum, this Note argues that other circuits should join the Seventh
Circuit and allow prisoners to use "actual innocence" to challenge their
erroneous sentences. If other circuits would adopt Narvaez, prisoners sentenced
in those circuits might finally have a chance to correct their erroneous
sentences. Stated another way, if Narvaez is not extended, a situation may very
well arise in which a prisoner will be forced to serve out his erroneous sentence
because of an obvious and indisputable error made by the sentencing court.
II. BACKGROUND

This Note concerns two mechanisms that sentencing courts use to
enhance a prisoner's sentence: the USSG and the ACCA. A prisoner's sentence
may be eligible for an increase under either the USSG or ACCA if, in addition
to his current conviction, he has certain types of prior "violent felony"
convictions.16 A recent Supreme Court case, Begay v. United States,'7 narrowed
the definition of "violent felony" under these two mechanisms. The effect of
this reinterpretation is that crimes once thought to be "violent felonies" are no
longer, and should have never been, classified as such.' 8 Consequently, a
prisoner whose sentence was enhanced due to his conviction of what was once
a "violent felony"-but is no longer considered a "violent felony" in light of
Begay-may have received an erroneously enhanced sentence. Part II.A
explains the USSG and the ACCA, and Part II.B examines the Supreme Court
decision that reinterpreted these two sentencing enhancement mechanisms.
A.

UnitedStates Sentencing Guidelines andArmed Career CriminalAct

The USSG require an increase in the sentencing guideline range for
defendants convicted of a "crime of violence" or a "controlled substance
offense" who also have at least two prior convictions of either "crimes of
violence" or "controlled substances offenses."1 9 Defendants who meet this
criteria are designated as "career offenders" under the USSG and are subject to
a substantial enhancement. 20 In 2005, the Supreme Court held in United States
v. Booker2' that the sentencing guidelines are now advisory: the sentencing
judge has the discretion to sentence a career offender outside of his applicable

16

See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.

1
18

553 U.S. 137 (2008).

19

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

Begay has been interpreted to be retroactive. See infra note 34.

§ 411.1.

Id. The amount by which a defendant's guideline range is increased varies in every case
because the guideline calculations are based on several factors unique to the defendant being
sentenced.
21
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
20
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guideline range. 2 2 Pre-Booker, the sentencing guidelines were mandatory: a
federal sentencing judge was required to hand down a sentence within the
prisoner's guideline range. 23 A prisoner subject to the career offender
enhancement who was sentenced pre-Booker was therefore guaranteed to
receive a sentence within the enhanced guidelines range. Now that the USSG
are advisory, a prisoner subject to the career offender enhancement who was
sentenced post-Booker may receive a sentence above or below the enhanced
guideline range.
The ACCA imposes a mandatory fifteen year prison sentence upon
defendants convicted of a felony weapons offense and who also have three or
more prior convictions for committing drug crimes or "violent felon[ies]."24
Booker is not applicable to sentences enhanced under the ACCA, as the ACCA
is statutory. Accordingly, unlike an enhancement under the USSG, the
sentencing judge does not have discretion to deviate from the applicable
sentencing range if the defendant is eligible for such an increase. Therein lies
the significant difference between the ACCA and the USSG. 25
B.

Begay v. United States

In Begay v. United States,26 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that drunk driving is not a violent felony under the ACCA. 27 The ACCA
defines a violent felony as "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year" that "(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another." 2 8
The Supreme Court explained that crimes listed in the ACCAburglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives-"involve
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct," 29 and so the term "violent felony"
applies only to crimes that are "roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of
risk posed, to the examples [listed in the ACCA] themselves." 3 0 The Court

22

Id. at 245.
23
The significance of Booker's relationship to "actual innocence" is discussed in Part V.C.
24
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
25
The difference between Booker's applicability to the USSG versus the ACCA is discussed
in Part V.D.

28

553 U.S. 137 (2008).
Id. at 148.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).

29

Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45.

30

Id. at 143.

26

27
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concluded that "their presence indicates that the statute covers only similar
crimes, rather than every crime that 'presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another."' 31 The Court found that if Congress would have intended for
a "violent felony" to encompass all crimes that pose a risk of physical injury to
another person, then it would not have listed examples at all. 32
Although Begay specifically involved the ACCA, several circuits have
noted that the language defining "violent felon[ies]" in the ACCA and USSG §
4B 1.2 is identical, and therefore interchangeable. 3 Further, Begay has been
interpreted to be retroactive.3 4 The result of Begay is that sentencing courts
have been misinterpreting the sentence enhancement provisions: certain crimes
once thought to constitute violent felonies under the ACCA and USSG for
sentence enhancement purposes are not, and should not have been, classified as
such at the prisoner's original sentencing. As a result, many prisoners have
erroneous sentences-if Begay had been in effect at the original sentencing,
then many prisoners would not have been subject to the enhancement. Thus, if
a sentencing judge enhanced a prisoner's sentence based on a crime no longer
considered "violent," then that prisoner's sentence may have been erroneously
calculated. A prisoner whose sentence may be affected by the Begay ruling
would therefore need a post-conviction remedy to challenge the validity of his
sentence.
III. OBSTACLES TO COLLATERAL REVIEW

A federal prisoner seeking to collaterally attack his erroneous sentence
will generally be forced to file a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.35 A § 2255
motion is used to "vacate, set aside, or correct" a sentence imposed "in excess

1

32

Id. at 142.
Id

3
See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Mason, 435 Fed. App'x 726, 730 n.2 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400,
403-04 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008); United States
v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 417 F.3d 990,
996 (8th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Ladwig, 432 F.3d 1001, 1005 n.9 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732, 740 n.9 (6th Cir. 2005) (using the USSG to interpret the
ACCA).
34
Jones v. United States, 689 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2012) ("Because Begay is a new,
substantive rule, we hold that Begay applies retroactively."); Sun Bear v. U.S., 644 F.3d 700, 703
(8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("The government has conceded... that Begay announced a new
substantive rule that should be applied retroactively if the application of § 924(e)(1) at issue
increased the defendant's statutory maximum sentence."); Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408,
415 (7th Cir. 2010) (Because the Begay rule is substantive, "it is retroactively applicable on
collateral review"). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is the only circuit
that has held that Begay is not retroactive. United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27, 36 n.3 (1st Cir.
2008).
3
BRIAN R. MEANS, POST CONVICTION REMEDIES § 5:6 (2013 ed.).
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of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack."3 6 Before a prisoner can file a cognizable § 2255 motion alleging
"actual innocence" of his Begay-type sentence, there are some procedural
obstacles through which he must pass before a federal court will review his
claim on the merits.
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which restricted the scope of habeas corpus relief for
federal prisoners. 3 7 AEDPA amended § 2255 by imposing some new
procedural restrictions, including a requirement that a prisoner obtain a
certificate of appealability before he can appeal the district court's decision, a
one year statute of limitations period, and a bar on filing second or successive §
2255 motions. 3 8 This Part discusses these procedural hurdles through which a
prisoner bringing a Begay-type sentencing error must travel before bringing a
cognizable § 2255 motion.
ProceduralDefault

A.

A prisoner seeking to challenge his Begay-type claim is required to
raise his claim on direct appeal before he raises the claim on collateral review. 3 9
The procedural default rule is a judicially created barrier created to "respect the
law's important interest in the finality of judgments."40 If a federal prisoner
fails to challenge his conviction or sentence on direct appeal, then his
subsequent habeas claim will be dismissed.
Statute ofLimitations

B.

The AEDPA imposes a strict one-year time limit to file a § 2255
motion. Section 2255(f) provides that the one-year time limit begins to run
from the latest of four possible dates.42 In the context of this Note, only two are
relevant: a prisoner must file a § 2255 motion within one year of the date on
41

36

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).
3
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 101, 110
Stat. 1214, 1217 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255 (2012)).
3
28 U.S.C. §§ 2253, 2255(f), (h) (2012). The certificate of appealability requirement was
met in every case discussed in this Note and does not need to be discussed at length.
3
Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). See also United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). There is an exception to the procedural default rule. Also judicially
created, this exception is known as the cause and prejudice standard. The cause and prejudice
standard is inapplicable in circumstances in which a prisoner is challenging his sentence based on
a post-conviction change in the law, as opposed to his underlying crime of conviction. The cause
and prejudice standard is therefore outside the scope of this Note.
40
Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504.
41
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012).
42

Id
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which the judgment of conviction became final, or within one year of the date
on which a newly asserted right became recognizable on collateral review,
whichever is later.43 Thus, if a prisoner fails to file his § 2255 motion to attack
his Begay-type claim within the one-year time period, his claim will be
dismissed.4
Second or Successive Motions

C.

The AEDPA also prohibits prisoners from filing second or successive §
2255 motions. If a prisoner has already filed a § 2255 motion, then he is barred
from filing a second or successive § 2255 motion 45 -which means that a
prisoner cannot file a § 2255 motion after his previous § 2255 motion has been
denied. The only exceptions to § 2255(h)'s ban on second or successive
motions is if there is (1) newly discovered evidence that establishes the
prisoner's innocence, or (2) a new rule of constitutional law was announced
after the prisoner was convicted and was previously unavailable to the
prisoner.46 Prisoners bringing Begay claims, however, are neither attempting to
introduce new evidence, nor arguing that Begay represents a new rule of
constitutional law.4 7 Thus, the AEDPA's bar on second or successive petitions
severely restricts their access to collateral review under § 2255.
Savings Clause

D.

There is an escape hatch that may allow otherwise ineligible petitioners
to seek habeas relief. Section 2255(e) allows a prisoner to file a § 2241 petition
if their § 2255 motion would be "inadequate or ineffective" to provide them
with a remedy.48 In other words, if § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to
provide the prisoner with a remedy, then he may use this "savings clause" to
bring a habeas corpus petition under § 2241. A § 2255 motion is not inadequate
or ineffective merely because a prisoner is procedurally defaulted (per the

43
Id There are also two other exceptions listed in § 2255(f), but neither will arise in Begaytype sentencing claims.
4

Id.

45

Id. § 2255(h).

46

Id

§§ 2255(h)(1)-(2).

47
See United States v. Wyatt, 672 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Quintero,
451 Fed. App'x 408, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2011); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1321-22
(11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Kenney, 391 Fed. App'x 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (dismissing
prisoner's claim that Begay announced a new rule of constitutional law for purposes of § 2255(h)
because Begay decided a question of statutory interpretation); United States v. Williams, 363
Fed. App'x 576, 578 (10th Cir. 2010).
48
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). A prisoner bringing a Begay-type sentencing claim for the first time
in a § 2255 motion would not have to resort to the savings clause, as his first § 2255 motion
would not be subject to the bar on second or successive motions. Id
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AEDPA limitations) from bringing a § 2255 motion. 4 9 As the Eleventh Circuit
noted: "[t]he existence of the statutory bar on second and successive motions
cannot mean that § 2255 is 'inadequate or ineffective' to test the legality of [a
petitioner]'s detention within the meaning of the savings clause. If it did, the
savings clause would eviscerate the second or successive motions bar."50
Section 2241, the habeas corpus petition, may be available to an
otherwise procedurally disqualified prisoner, however, if he can show that the
sentencing error is "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice."5' This standard is met if the prisoner shows that he is
actually innocent. 52 This "actual innocence" exception to § 2255's procedural
barriers may be the last resort for prisoners who have been procedurally
disqualified from obtaining § 2255 relief 3 and are seeking to challenge their
Begay-type sentence based on a post-conviction change in law. In sum, if a
prisoner would be otherwise procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion,
then he may be able to bring his claim in a § 2241 habeas petition if he can
show that he is "actually innocent." 5 4
IV. MAJORITY VIEW OF "ACTUAL INNOCENCE" OF GUIDELINE'S SENTENCES
POST BEGAY

What constitutes "actual innocence" is a contentious and unsettled
question among the circuits. It is to that question that this Note now turns. The
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the "actual innocence" exception
in § 2255(e) to encompass only claims alleging innocence of the underlying
crime of conviction.5 5 In support of this interpretation, the Eleventh Circuit
derived its jurisprudence, in part, from a Seventh Circuit case, In re

49
See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1307-08; Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 586 (10th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d
34, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1998); Triestman v. United
States, 124 F.3d 361, 376 (2d Cir. 1997).
50
Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1308; see also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 608.

s1
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
52
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (finding that the miscarriage of justice
exception applies when a petitioner is actually innocent of the crime of which he was convicted
or the penalty which was imposed).
5
The "actual innocence" exception available in § 2255(e)'s savings clause is a gateway
through the rule against successive § 2255 motions, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454
(1986); second, or "abusive" petitions, McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991); the
procedural default rule, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); and the one year statute
of limitations, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1932 (2013).
54
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1932 (the "actual innocence" exception has survived AEDPA's
passage).
5s
See supra Parts II.B-D.
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Davenport.5 6 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit derived its jurisprudence on this
issue from a case factually similar to Davenport with an identical holding.57 To
understand why the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits should adopt the approach
taken by the Seventh Circuit-that prisoners can be "actually innocent" of their
erroneously enhanced sentences-the reasoning behind the current approach
taken by the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits must be explained. This Part begins
by discussing the facts and holding of Davenport, and then discusses how the
Eighth and the Eleventh Circuits relied on Davenport and similar cases to
interpret the "actual innocence" exception.
A.

In re Davenport

Davenport involved two prisoners, both of whom were attacking their
sentence. Davenport was convicted in 1991 of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, and his sentence was enhanced under the ACCA due to prior weapons
convictions.58 Nichols was convicted of the use of a firearm in the commission
of a drug offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).59 Both prisoners sought
relief: Davenport filed a § 2255 motion, attacking his enhancement under the
ACCA, and Nichols filed a habeas corpus petition under § 2241 (using §
2255(e)) attacking his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).60 Davenport
claimed that one of his predicate felonies (burglary) was not within the scope of
the ACCA (i.e., not a violent felony). 6 1 Nichols argued that his conviction for
"use" of a firearm in violation of § 924(c) was illegal in light of a subsequently
decided Supreme Court case that held that "use" of a firearm required more
than "mere possession.62 Both petitioners were arguing actual innocence:
Davenport was arguing innocence of his sentence, Nichols was arguing
innocence of his crime of conviction.
The Seventh Circuit found that Nichols brought a legitimate claim of
actual innocence because he was alleging that he was innocent of his crime of
conviction.63 Because the Supreme Court eliminated the crime from the statute
under which Nichols was convicted, Nichols "ha[d] a claim that he [was]
indeed being held in prison for a nonexistent crime." 64 Davenport on the other
hand, was "attacking his sentence rather than his conviction, for the armed

56

5

58

59

In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 605 (7th Cir. 1998).
Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Part IV.C.2.
Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 607.
Id

60

Id.

61

Id.
Id.

62

63

Id. at 6 10.

6

Id.
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career criminal act is a sentence-enhancement statute."65 Davenport's actual
innocence claim was therefore inefficient because being "innocent" of the
armed career criminal status was not the same thing as claiming "actual
innocence" of the crime of conviction.** The rule of Davenport was that
sentence enhancement errors cannot be grounds for "actual innocence" claims;
a prisoner can only be "actually innocent" of his underlying crime of
conviction, not a sentence. This holding was used as support for the Eighth
and Eleventh Circuit decisions that follow.
B.

The Eleventh Circuit's View of "Actual Innocence ": Gilbert v. United
States

In Gilbert v. United States,68 the petitioner was indicted in 1995 for one
count of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and one count of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. 69 The petitioner also had three
prior drug convictions. 70 Based on these prior drug convictions, the government
had a right to insist on a mandatory life sentence under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). 7 ' However, the government waived this right to do so as a part of
the plea agreement in return for Gilbert pleading guilty to the indictment.72
Gilbert was sentenced as a career offender under the USSG based on
two prior convictions: possession of cocaine with intent to sell (a "controlled
substance offense") and carrying a concealed weapon (a "crime of violence").
As a result of the career offender enhancement, Gilbert's guideline range was
292 to 365 months; without the enhancement, the guideline range would have
been 151 to 188 months.74 Gilbert ultimately received a sentence of 292 months
imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.75
Years later, in United States v. Archer,76 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, in light of Begay, carrying a

65
66
67
68
69

Id at 609.
Id at 609-10.
Id. at 611-12.
640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1298.

7o
Id (noting that his prior drug convictions included a March 1990 conviction for possession
of cocaine, a June 1990 conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and a
January 1992 conviction for possession of marijuana).
71

Id.

72

Id.

7

Id at 1299.
Id at 1299-1300.

74
7
76

Id at 1300.
531 F.3d 1347 (11 th Cir. 2008).
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concealed firearm was not a "violent felony" under the ACCA." Gilbert filed a
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,8 arguing that, because his
conviction for carrying a concealed firearm is no longer a "violent felony," he
was not a career offender under the USSG and should not have received the
corresponding guideline enhancement. 79 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, disagreed with Gilbert and denied his § 2241
petition.80
1.

Gilbert's Enhanced USSG Sentence

The first ground on which the court relied was that Gilbert's sentence
was erroneously increased within the maximum sentencing guideline range, for
two reasons. First, Gilbert would not have been guaranteed a lower sentence at
his original sentencing if Begay and Archer were in effect at his original
sentencing.81 The Eleventh Circuit explained that "Gilbert would have had a
lower guidelines range in that pre-Booker, mandatory guidelines era and would
have received a lower sentence if we assume that the government still would
have waived its statutory right to have a mandatory life sentence imposed upon
him. But that is a big assumption." 82 The court explained:
If the Begay decision had been on the books when Gilbert was
facing these charges, the government would have known that
the guidelines range he faced was 151 to 188 months [instead
of 292 to 365 months]. Given a minimum sentence that was
141 months lower, the government might well have decided
not to waive the § 851 notice and the mandatory life sentence it
had an absolute right to insist on under § 841(b)(1)(A). It is
one thing not to insist on a life sentence when the defendant is
facing at least 292 months without the enhancement, and quite
another to forgo it if he might be sentenced to less than half
that much time . . .. [T]he record does not establish that it

n

Id. at 1352.

Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1301. Gilbert had filed an unsuccessful § 2255 motion
five years
earlier, forcing him to resort to a § 2241 petition to avoid the ban on second or successive
petitions. Id
78

79

Id

so
Id. at 1302. Gilbert properly obtained a Certificate of Appealability from the District Court,
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) to appeal the sentencing court's judgment in a habeas
corpus case. Id. On appeal, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit originally agreed with Gilbert's
argument, finding that the savings clause in § 2255(e) authorized Gilbert to bring his Begay
sentencing claim in a § 2241 petition. Id The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel
decision for the reasons that follow. Id.
81
Id at 1303.
82
Id
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would have [waived its right to insist on a mandatory life
sentence] if it could not have counted on the career offender
enhancement to double the sentence that Gilbert would
receive.
In other words, if Gilbert's guideline range would have been 151 to
188 months, the government might not have felt that his was a sufficient
sentencing range and waived its right to a mandatory life sentence.84 In fact, the
court speculated that given Gilbert's extensive criminal background, he might
have received an even longer sentence if the government would not have made
85
the plea agreement.
Second, the court noted that Gilbert could receive the same or an even
longer sentence upon resentencing if he were awarded the § 2241 relief he was
seeking. 86 The court noted that even if Gilbert would have received the lower
guideline range of 151 to 188 months, there was "no guarantee that his new
sentence under the ,ost-Booker advisory guidelines system [would] be shorter
than 292 months." ' There are several sentencing factors that a sentencing
judge, upon rehearing, could have used to impose a sentence equal to or greater
than his original sentence of 292 months.88 In a six-year period, Gilbert was
convicted of five drug felonies and three weapons felonies. 89 He was an eighttime drug and weapons felon, every time he received probation he violated it,
and he took his six year old daughter along with him to several drug deals. 90
Based on this extensive criminal history, the court found that "[a] sentencing
judge could easily decide to vary [significantly] upwards from the advisory
guidelines range in view of: 'the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant."' 91
2.

"Actual Innocence"

The second ground upon which the Gilbert court relied was that the
"actual innocence" exception includes only those claims that allege innocence
of the underlying crime of conviction, and does not include sentencing claims. 92
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on finality interests. The
83
84

id.
Id

85

Id

86

Id
Id. at 1304.
Id.

87
88
89

Id

90

Id

9'

Id (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012)).
Id at 1319-20.

92
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court noted that "one of the principal functions of AEDPA was to ensure a
greater degree of finality for convictions."93 Because Gilbert's erroneous
sentence did not exceed the maximum authorized by the USSG, the court
concluded that "[tihe exception that Gilbert would have us write into § 2255[]
using the savings clause as our pen would wreak havoc on the finality interests
that Congress worked so hard to protect with the AEDPA provisions."94
To further this interest in finality, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that §
2255's savings clause was meant to apply only to situations in which a
retroactive Supreme Court decision eliminates the crime for which a prisoner
was convicted. 95 In such a situation, the prisoner would be innocent of his
underlying crime, and would have therefore been convicted of a nonexistent
offense.96
In this case, the court reasoned that the "crimes for which [Gilbert] was
convicted, possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing
marijuana with intent to distribute, do exist."97 Gilbert was not convicted of
being a career offender: he was convicted of his drug crimes, and then had the
enhancement applied to calculate his sentence.98 In other words, Begay did not
affect Gilbert's underlying crime of conviction; it (possibly) affected the length
of his sentence that he was serving for those still-existing crimes. The court
explained that "[i]f guidelines enhancements were crimes, they would have to
be charged in the indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt." 99 The court concluded that "Gilbert's position turns on treating
sentences as convictions."' 00
In support of this conclusion-that "actual innocence" does not
encompass a USSG sentencing error-the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on
0 The court
Davenport.o'
emphasized that "Davenport [was] attacking his
sentence rather than his conviction, for the armed career criminal act is a
sentence-enhancement statute; he is 'innocent' (if his claim has merit) only in a
technical sense." 02 The court pointed out that "Nichols, unlike Gilbert and

94
9

Id at 1310 (citing Johnson v. United States, 340 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2003)).

Id

96

Id at 1319-20.
Id

9

Id (emphasis added).

98

Id at 1320.

99

Id

100

Id.

The court also cited cases from other circuits, but all of those other cases were factually
similar to Davenport and reached an identical conclusion. The Eleventh Circuit placed a special
emphasis on Davenport because one of the dissenting opinions interpreted Davenport as support
for Gilbert's claim. See id at 1335-36 (Martin, J., dissenting).
102
Id. at 1314 (quoting In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1998)).
101
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[unlike] Davenport, 'ha[d] a claim that he [was] indeed being held in prison for
a nonexistent crime . . .. The Seventh Circuit's position on the issue before us

could not be clearer: Section 2255(e)'s savings clause does not apply to
sentencing claims."' 10 3 The court concluded that "the Davenport decision
rejects" Gilbert's position "in this case that the savings clause extends to
sentencing claims." 1 04
3.

Unresolved Issues

The Gilbert court expressly left two important issues open. First, the
court did not decide whether the actual innocence exception could be utilized
by prisoners whose sentences were erroneously increased above the maximum
authorized by the USSG. 05 Second, the court did not decide whether the
"actual innocence" exception extends to prisoners filing a first time § 2255
motion. o0 Gilbert had already filed a § 2255 motion after his original
conviction, and was forced to use § 2241 after the Begay decision in order to
avoid AEDPA's ban on second or successive motions. The court stated: "We
do not decide whether a claim that the sentencing guidelines were misapplied
may be brought in a first time § 2255 motion. Nor do we decide if the savings
clause in § 2255(e) would permit a prisoner to bring a0 7§ 2241 petition claiming
that [his sentence exceeded] the statutory maximum."'
The Eighth Circuit's View of "ActualInnocence ": Sun Bear v. United
States

C.

In Sun Bear v. United States,108 the petitioner plead guilty to seconddegree murder. 109 At his sentencing, the court held that "Sun Bear's prior
felony convictions for attempted escape, attempted theft of a vehicle, and
attempted burglary of a commercial building were 'crimes of violence"' under
the sentencing guidelines.no Accordingly, Sun Bear was determined to be a
career offender, and his sentence was enhanced to 360 months to life under the
pre-Booker mandatory sentencing scheme."' Without the USSG enhancement,

Id. at 1314-15 (quoting In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
103
added)).
104
Id. at 1314.
"os

Id at 1323.

106

Id

107

id

los

644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2011).

109

Id at 701.

110

Id

II

Id.
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his guidelines range would have been 292 to 365 months.1 2 After the Supreme
Court decided Begay, Sun Bear filed a first time motion to vacate his sentence
under § 2255." He had not previously filed for § 2255 relief, so unlike Gilbert,
he was not forced to resort to filing a habeas petition under § 2241. He asserted
that the application of his USSG enhancement was illegal because his three
prior felony convictions are no longer crimes of violence under the Sentencing
Guidelines in light of Begay.114 The district court denied Sun Bear's petition,
but a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.' 15 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel decision and denied Sun
Bear's § 2241 petition."' 6
1.

Sun Bear's Enhanced USSG Sentence

The first ground upon which the Eighth Circuit relied to deny Sun
Bear's § 2255 petition was that Sun Bear's erroneous sentence was increased
within the maximum guideline range for two reasons." 7 First, if Begay were in
effect at his original hearing, and he did not receive the career offender
enhancement, his sentence of 360 months would have been within the
applicable guideline range for second degree murder."' 8 Therefore, Sun Bear's
"360-month sentence [was] lawful, both at the time of his conviction and
sentencing, and now.""19 Secondly, Sun Bear could receive the same sentence
upon resentencing if he were granted the § 2255 relief he requests. 2 0 Sun
Bear's sentence of 360 months is within the applicable guideline range of
months for second degree murder,'21 even without the enhancement.122
2.

"Actual Innocence"

The court also discussed the "actual innocence" exception, but its
interpretation was not as clear as the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation on this

112

Id

"'

Id.

114

Id.
Id at 703-04.

"
116

Id. at 704.

1'

Id. at 705.

118

id

119

Id

120

id
121 The federal statute governing the sentencing range for second degree murder states that
"[w]hoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or
for life." 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012).
122
Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705.
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issue. The court stated that a § 2255 collateral attack on a sentence only applies
to "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice."l23 In the Eighth Circuit, it is a "basic principal that, in sentencing, a
miscarriage of justice cognizable under § 2255 occurs when the sentence is in
excess of that authorized by law": 124 one that exceeds the maximum for the
offense of conviction.12 5 Because Sun Bear's sentence was increased within the
statutory maximum authorized for second degree murder, and because he could
receive the same sentence upon resentencing, "no miscarriage of justice [was]

at issue."l26
The court also stated that in the Eighth Circuit, "the miscarriage-ofjustice exception ... applies 'only when petitioners have produced convincing
new evidence of actual innocence'; new evidence that defendant was 'actually
innocent of the sentence imposed' would not be sufficient because the 'actualinnocence exception does not apply to noncapital sentences."' 1 2 7 This statement
indicates that even if the erroneous enhancement resulted in a sentence above
the maximum, a § 2255 claim would be denied because a prisoner cannot be
innocent of his sentence. The court was quoting another Eighth Circuit case:
United States v. Wiley.128 Wiley, in turn, derived this holding from a prior
Eighth Circuit case, Embrey v. Hershberger,'2 9 in which the Eighth Circuit set
this precedent.1 30
In Embrey, the petitioner brought a § 2255 claim alleging that he was
innocent of his sentence enhancement.13' The petitioner had been convicted of
armed bank robbery in violation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act,13 2 and of
kidnapping, in violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act.'33 He was sentenced to
two consecutive terms of twenty years, one for each conviction.13 4 He argued
that his sentence was erroneous because his conviction fell under the Federal
Bank Robbery Act, which was a comprehensive statute that provided
punishment to the exclusion of all other applicable federal statutes.1 35 In
denying petitioner's relief, the court stated:
123
124
125

Id at 710.
Id. at 706 (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979)).
Id. at 705-06 (citing United States v. Stobaugh, 420 F.3d 796, 804 (8th Cir. 2005)).

126

Id at 706.

127

Id. (quoting United States v. Wiley, 245 F.3d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 2001)).
245 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2001).
131 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1997).

128
129

130
131
132

Id. at 740-41.
Id. at 740.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (2012).

134

Id. § 1201(a)(1); Embrey, 131 F.3d at 739.
Embrey, 131 F.3d at 739.

13s

Id. at 739-40.
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[A] court ought to correct a plain forfeited error that causes the
conviction or sentencing of a defendant who is actually
innocent, but such cases usually, if not always, involve
defendants who were innocent in the sense that they did not
commit the acts with which they were charged. That is not our
case ... [I]n noncapital cases the concept of actual innocence
is 'easy to grasp,' because
'it simply means the person didn't
36

commit the crime."'l

Although Sun Bear did not explicitly rely on Davenport, it derived its
jurisprudence on this issue from Embrey, which stands for the exact same rule
as Davenport: the "actual innocence" exception includes the underlying crime
of conviction only, and does not extend to noncapital sentences. 37
3.

Unresolved Issues

Although the court ultimately concluded that Sun Bear's sentence was
legal, the Court left two important issues open. First, it is unclear whether the
"actual innocence" exception extends to sentencing in any scenario in the
Eighth Circuit. Although the court indicates that the "actual innocence"
exception does not apply to noncapital sentencing at all, 38 another statement
can be interpreted to mean that an erroneous sentence increased above the
maximum may be a miscarriage of justice warranting § 2255 relief.139 Second,
the Court didn't decide whether the "actual innocence" exception applies to §
2241 petitions. The court discussed only first time § 2255 motions.14 0
V. ANOTHER INTERPRETATION OF "ACTUAL INNOCENCE"
A recent Seventh Circuit case may have reinterpreted the traditional
view of "actual innocence" by nullifying the rule of Davenport.As discussed in
Part IV, Davenport has been interpreted to stand for the proposition that "actual
innocence" extends to claims alleging innocence of the underlying crime of
conviction, and does not extend to noncapital USSG sentences.14 1 Further, other
circuits have used this interpretation as support to develop a similar meaning of
the "actual innocence" exception in § 2255.142 But in Narvaez v. United

Id. at 740-41 (citing United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Relying on a case that has an identical holding as Davenport, rather than relying on
Davenport itself, is also significant. See infra Part V.A.
138
Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2011).
136

137

13

Id.

140

Id. at 702-03.

141

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra PartIV.

142

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss2/9

20

Siepel: The Wrong Kind of Innocence: Why United States v. Begay Warrants

THE WRONG KIND OFINNOCENCE

2013]

685

States,143 decided after Gilbert and Sun Bear, the Seventh Circuit granted relief
to a prisoner who alleged "actual innocence" of his erroneously enhanced
sentence.144 In its analysis, Narvaez suggests that the scope of Davenport-that
the "actual innocence" exception of § 2255 encompasses the underlying crime
of conviction only-may no longer be so narrow.
This Part first argues that Narvaez did in fact fundamentally reinterpret
Davenport, and therefore Davenport is no longer good law. Next, this Part
argues that Narvaez should have a profound effect on the other circuits that
have faced "actual innocence" challenges to Begay sentencing errors. This Part
will then discuss a possible limitation on the holding of Narvaez: a Supreme
Court case that may affect the legality of Begay-type sentences. Finally, this
Part argues that Narvaez-a USSG case-should extend to erroneously
enhanced ACCA sentences.
A.

The Seventh Circuit's View of "Actual Innocence ": Narvaez v. United
States

In Narvaez,14 5 the petitioner pleaded guilty in 2003 to bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).146 Narvaez was sentenced as a career offender
under § 4131.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines because he had
previously been convicted twice of escape (involving failure to return to
confinement),14 7 which was a violent felony pre-Begay.148 As a result of the §
4B 1.1 enhancement, Narvaez's then-mandatory sentencing range was increased
from 100-125 months to 151-188 months. 14 9 Narvaez received 170 months, 50
a sentence higher than the maximum he could have received had the sentence
enhancement not been applied.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in Begay that escape was no
longer a violent felony within the meaning of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.' 5 ' Narvaez filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to §
2255.152 He argued that his § 411.1 sentence enhancement was illegal in light
of Begay and Chambers because his prior escape convictions are no longer

143

674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011).

'"

Id. at 630.
674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id at 623.

145
146

147
148
149
150
1si
152

Id. at 623-24.
Id. at 624 n.4.
Id. at 624.
Id.
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008).
Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 625.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2013

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 116, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

686

[Vol. 116

crimes of violence. 15 3 The district court dismissed his motion. 154 The Seventh
Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, granted Narvaez's § 2255 motion,
and ordered Narvaez to be resentenced.15
1.

Narvaez's Enhanced USSG Sentence

One ground upon which the Seventh Circuit relied was that Narvaez's
sentence, unlike those of Gilbert and Sun Bear, was erroneously increased
above the maximum guideline range.' 56 If Begay had been in effect at his
original sentencing, then he could not have received his 170-month sentence.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that although "sentencing errors are generally
not cognizable on collateral review . .. Mr. Narvaez's case, however, does not
come within this general rule. It presents a special and very narrow exception:
A post conviction [sic] clarification in the law has rendered the sentencing
court's decision unlawful."
The court further reasoned that "Mr. Narvaez
never should have been subjected to the enhanced punishment reserved for
such repetitive and violent offenders,"15 8 because "[t]he career offender status
illegally increased Mr. Narvaez's sentence approximately five years beyond
that authorized by the sentencing scheme.'5 9 Therefore, Mr. Narvaez's claim
goes to the fundamental legality of his sentence and asserts an error that
constitutes a miscarriage of justice, entitling him to relief." 6 0 The Seventh
Circuit ordered the district court to resentence Narvaez without the erroneous
career offender enhancement.16'
2.

Narvaez Broadened the Scope of "Actual Innocence"

One of the most significant aspects of Narvaez lies in its
reinterpretation of Davenport.'62 In Davenport, two petitioners sought relief:
Davenport for his enhancement under the ACCA, and Nichols for his
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for "use" of a firearm during a drug

153
Id The government conceded that Narvaez's prior convictions of escape (on which his
sentence enhancement was based) are no longer crimes of violence under the career offender
guidelines of § 4B 1.1. Id.
154
id
1
156
15
15

15
160
161
162

Id. at 630.
Id at 626-27.
Id. at 627 (internal citations omitted).
Id
Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
Id
Id
a
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 605 (7th Cir. 1998).
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offense. 16 3 Davenport claimed that one of his predicate felonies-burglarywas no longer within the scope of the ACCA (i.e., not a violent felony)."
Nichols, on the other hand, argued that his conviction for "use" of a firearm
was illegal in light of a subsequent Supreme Court case that held that "use" of a
firearm requires more than mere possession.16 5
Both petitioners were arguing "actual innocence": Davenport,
innocence of his sentence and Nichols, the crime of conviction. The Seventh
Circuit found that Nichols was "actually innocent" of the crime of
conviction,' 6 6 but Davenport's claim failed because being "innocent" of the
armed career criminal status was not the same thing as arguing "actual
innocence" of the crime of conviction.16 7 Thus, the rule of Davenport was that
sentence enhancements cannot be grounds for "actual innocence" claims; a
prisoner can only be "actually innocent" of a conviction, not sentence.
But Narvaez appears to interpret Davenport differently. In Narvaez, the
Seventh Circuit analogized Narvaez's position to that of Nichols, not
Davenport:
In In re Davenport, a federal prisoner filed a motion to vacate,
in which he claimed that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) for "use" of a firearm during the commission of a drug
offense was illegal in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bailey v. United States ... We held in Davenport that, in light
of the Court's Bailey decision, the prisoner was "being held in
prison for a nonexistent crime," and, therefore, may be entitled
to collateral relief based upon his Bailey claim . .. Although

[Davenport] provide[s] collateral relief when a defendant is
innocent of the underlying crime, we believe that reasoning
extends to this case, where a post-conviction Supreme Court
ruling made clear that Mr. Narvaez was not eligible for the
categorization of violent offender wrongfully imposed upon
him.
Narvaez seems to suggest that serving an erroneously enhanced
sentence is equivalent to being punished for a non-existent crime. Narvaez's
reinterpretation of Davenport further suggests that the innocence claimed by
prisoners who were given sentences like Narvaez's-sentences that were
erroneously enhanced above the statutory maximum-is more analogous to the

'

Id. at 607.

164

Id.

165

Id.

Id. at 612.
Id. at 609-10.
168
Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 628 & n.12 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
166

'
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type of innocence asserted by Nichols in Davenport. In sum, Narvaez adopts
the view that a prisoner could file a § 2255 petition asserting "actual
innocence" of his illegally-enhanced USSG sentence.169
Although Narvaez dealt exclusively with § 2255 motions, the Seventh
Circuit recently held in Brown v. Carawayl70 that a Begay-type sentence is
corrigible in a § 2241 proceeding.17 1 In Caraway, the petitioner attacked his
erroneously enhanced sentence in a § 2241 petition, claiming that the
sentencing court's miscalculation of his sentence (in light of Begay) was a
miscarriage of justice and he was therefore "actually innocent of being a career
offender." 72 The Seventh Circuit stated that "[a]lthough Narvaez arose in a
distinct procedural context (there, the § 2255 motion was petitioner's first), its
reasoning regarding the nature of the error applies here." 73 Interestingly, the
Seventh Circuit noted that it disagreed with the interpretation of the savings
clause advanced by the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits. 74 The court stated that
"[t]he text of the clause focuses on the legality of the prisoner's detention ... it
does not limit its scope to testing the legality of the underlying criminal
conviction."' 75 Thus, the court concluded "that a [prisoner] may utilize the
savings clause to challenge the misapplication of the career offender
Guideline." 76
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit extended the Narvaez holding to include
§ 2241 petitions. As it stands in the Seventh Circuit, a misapplication of the
USSG is a fundamental miscarriage of justice corrigible in a § 2255 or a § 2241
proceeding.1 77 Stated another way, a prisoner can be actually innocent of his
erroneously enhanced sentence in both a § 2255 and a § 2241 proceeding. 178
And, if a miscarriage of justice occurs when a prisoner's sentence is

169
170

Id at 629.
719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013).

171 Id. at 587-88.
172
173

174

Id. at 586.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.

Id.
Id. The court limited this holding to sentences that were imposed before the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Booker. Id. The significance of Booker's relation to "actual innocence"
is discussed in Part V.A.
1n
Although the Seventh Circuit did not make this explicit holding in Narvaez, it did so in
Caraway. The court stated in Caraway, "Narvaez concluded that a misapplication of the
mandatory career offender Guideline presented a cognizable non-constitutional claim for initial
collateral relief because the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice." Caraway, 719 F.3d at 587;
see also Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that Narvaez held that a
miscarriage of justice occurred when a prisoner's sentence was erroneously increased above the
maximum authorized by the USSG).
17s
See supra note 177.
17

176
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erroneously enhanced above the maximum, as Narvaez suggests,179 then it is
unlikely that Davenport survives Narvaez and Caraway.
B.

The Narvaez Holding Has Been Limited

Although Narvaez held that the "actual innocence" exception applies to
USSG sentences that are erroneously enhanced above the maximum authorized
by the USSG, this holding 8 0 has recently been complicated by a subsequent
decision. In Hawkins v. United States,'8 ' the Seventh Circuit narrowed the
circumstances in which Narvaez can be utilized by prisoners.'82 This Part
discusses the case that limited Narvaez; then this part rejects the argument that
Hawkins overrules Narvaez completely.
1.

The Availability of the Narvaez Rule Is Dependent Upon
When a Prisoner Was Originally Sentenced

In light of Hawkins, the availability of Narvaez is dependent upon
when a prisoner was originally sentenced.' 8 3 Specifically, Hawkins suggests
that Narvaez and Caraway are available only to prisoners sentenced before
Booker,'84 a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
USSG are now advisory.
In Hawkins, the petitioner pleaded guilty to assault which translated to
a guideline range of either 15 to 21 months or 21 to 24 months
imprisonment.18 6 The petitioner had two prior convictions of "walkaway
escape," which was a violent felony under the USSG in the Seventh Circuit at
the time he was sentenced.' 8 7 Accordingly, petitioner was a career offender
Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 630 (7th Cir. 2011).

'

180
Hereinafter the Narvaez rule includes the addition of Caraway,that a misapplication of the
USSG is a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice corrigible in a § 2241 proceeding in addition to a §
2255 proceeding.
181 706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013).
182
Id at 824; see also infra Part V.C.

'

See Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 821.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005); Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 822.
185
Booker, 543 U.S. at 259; see also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 271 (2007)
("[T]he Court [in Booker] concluded that rendering the Guidelines advisory came closest to what
Congress would have intended had it known that the Guidelines were vulnerable to Sixth
Amendment challenge. Under the advisory Guidelines system described in Booker, judges would
no longer be confined to the sentencing range dictated by the Guidelines, but would be obligated
to 'take account' of that range.").
"8 Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 821. The sentencing judge did not decide which was applicable
because petitioner was eligible for a career offender enhancement in light of his prior violent
felony convictions. Id.
184

187

Id.
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under the USSG and his correlating guideline range was 151-188 months; he
received 151 months.' 88 Three years later, the Supreme Court concluded that
escape was not a violent felony under the ACCA and the USSG.' 89 Petitioner
then filed a motion under § 2255 to vacate his sentence.190
In denying petitioner's motion, the Court distinguished petitioner's
case from Narvaez. Hawkins argued that this case was analogous to Narvaez
because his sentence was erroneously increased above the maximum authorized
by the USSG.' 9' But the court pointed out that Narvaez, unlike Hawkins, had
been sentenced pre-Booker when the guidelines were mandatory and "were the
practical equivalent of a statute."l 9 2 Therefore, it was arguable that Hawkins's
sentence "exceeded the maximum authorized by 'law."'l 9 3 In the post-Booker
sentencing scheme, the court pointed out, "the guidelines no longer bind the
sentencing judge."' 9 4 Thus, an erroneous calculation of a post-Booker sentence
cannot be said to exceed the maximum authorized by "law."' 95
Hawkins thus limits Narvaez significantly: if a prisoner was sentenced
pre-Booker, then he could be "actually innocent" of his sentence under
Narvaez.196 If he were sentenced post-Booker, then Narvaez would be
After Hawkins, there is now a dichotomy of erroneously
unavailable.'
enhanced USSG sentences: those imposed pre-Booker and those imposed postBooker. Although Hawkins limits Narvaez, it does not completely overrule
Narvaez, as the subsequent section will explain.

Id. Petitioner was originally sentenced two years before Booker, and his appeal was
pending when Booker was decided. Id. at 822. The Seventh Circuit remanded his case so that the
sentencing court could resentence him in light of Booker. Id. The sentencing court imposed the
exact same sentence on remand, with Booker in effect. Id.
18
United States v. Chambers, 555 U.S. 122, 127-30 (2009). Chambers held that escape was
not a violent felony under the ACCA, id., but this holding applies to the USSG because the
language of these two sentence enhancing mechanisms is identical. See Hawkins, 706 F.3d at
822; see also cases cited supra note 33.
190
Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 822.
188

'1

Id.

192

Id.

193

Id.

Id. In Caraway, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding of Hawkins and applied it to §
2241 petitions: "the misapplication of the guidelines, at least where (as here) the defendant was
sentenced in the pre-Booker era, represents a fundamental defect that constitutes a miscarriage of
justice corrigible in a § 2241 proceeding." Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2013).
195
See Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 823-25.
194

19'

See id at 825.

197

Id.
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Narvaez Was Not Overruled

In Hawkins, the Seventh Circuit held that prisoners sentenced postBooker cannot be resentenced because their Begay-type sentences would not
have been increased above the maximum authorized by law.' 98 Accordingly, an
argument can be made that Hawkins completely destroys Narvaez. Under this
view, prisoners sentenced pre-Booker, who would be resentenced post-Booker,
would similarly be unable to show that his sentence was increased above the
maximum authorized by law. After all, in the post-Booker sentencing scheme,
the sentencing court has discretion to deviate from the guideline range and
impose the exact same erroneous sentence as the one imposed pre-Booker.199 if
a prisoner could receive the same sentence upon resentencing, this argument
goes, then his sentence would not "exceed the maximum authorized by law"
and therefore is not a miscarriage ofjustice.2 00
The Seventh Circuit did not address this issue in Hawkins, but it did
reject this argument in Narvaez. The government made this exact assertion in
an attempt to dissuade the Court from resentencing Narvaez. The government
argued that "because Mr. Narvaez would be exposed to the full range of
punishment authorized by Congress for his crime at resentencing, and would
remain eligible for the identical . . . sentence under the advisory guidelines, his

claim does not present a fundamental defect." 2 0 1 The court rejected this
argument, concluding that it would be pure speculation to assume that a
prisoner sentenced pre-Booker (with the erroneous enhancement) would receive
the same sentence at his post-Booker resentencing (without the erroneous
enhancement):
Speculation that the district court today might impose the same
sentence is not enough to overcome the fact that, at the time of
his initial sentencing, Mr. Narvaez was sentenced based on the
equivalent of a nonexistent offense. As the Supreme Court put
it in Hicks v. Oklahoma, to assume that the same sentence
would have been imposed in the absence of the career offender

198

id.

199
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005); see also Cunningham v. California,
549 U.S. 270, 271 (2007) ("[T]he Court [in Booker] concluded that rendering the Guidelines
advisory came closest to what Congress would have it intended had it known that the Guidelines
were vulnerable to Sixth Amendment challenge. Under the advisory Guidelines system described
in Booker, judges would no longer be confined to the sentencing range dictated by the
Guidelines, but would be obligated to 'take account' of that range.").
200
See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1304 (11th Cir. 2011) ("There
is,
however, no guarantee that [Gilbert's] new sentence under the post-Booker advisory guidelines
system will be shorter than [his original sentence]. It could be the same or even longer.").
201
Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 2011).
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provision is 'frail conjecture that' evinces in itself 'an arbitrary
disregard of the petitioner's right to liberty.' 2 02
As Hawkins did not address this issue, this portion of Narvaez remains
good law. Hawkins therefore limited Narvaez, but did not overrule it
completely. As it stands, the rule of Narvaez seems to be that Seventh Circuit
prisoners sentenced pre-Booker, whose sentences were erroneously increased
above the maximum authorized by the then-mandatory USSG range, may be
"actually innocent" of their erroneously enhanced sentences.
C.

What Are the Implications ofNarvaez on Other Circuits?

Although Hawkins recently limited the holding of Narvaez,2 03 Narvaez
nonetheless casts doubt on the validity of Davenport.If Davenport is no longer
good law, it would follow that an interpretation based, in part, on Davenport's
holding would be somewhat weakened. The Eleventh Circuit explicitly relied
on Davenport in support of its conclusion that the "actual innocence" exception
includes innocence of a prisoner's underlying noncapital crime only, 204 and the
Eighth Circuit relied on a case with an identical holding.205 As Davenport may
no longer stand for that proposition, the reasoning of these circuits may be open
to attack, or at the very least, called into question.
The true significance of Narvaez, however, is not merely that it
weakens the reasoning of another case that relied on Davenport for support.
Rather, Narvaez questions what was once a universally accepted definition of
"actual innocence." Narvaez stands for the proposition that the scope of "actual
innocence" needs to be reexamined and broadened in light of Begay and its
progeny. The Seventh Circuit recognized that prisoners like Narvaez, whose
sentences were erroneously enhanced because of a mistake by the sentencing
court, deserve to be resentenced.206 The court realized that the only way to
provide relief to a prisoner like Narvaez was to extend the scope of the "actual
innocence" exception to include noncapital sentencing errors in limited
circumstances, even if doing so meant reinterpreting its own case that stood for

the contrary view. 2 0 7

202

Id. (citations omitted).

203
Narvaez will hereinafter include the limitation placed on it by Hawkins. Thus, for the
remainder of this Note, the rule of Narvaez is: a prisoner can use the "actual innocence"
exception in § 2255 to attack his erroneously enhanced sentence, but only if he was sentenced
pre-Booker.
204
See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1314; supra Part IV.B.2.
205 See Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2011); supra Part IV.C.2.

206

Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 629.

207

Id. at 628-29.
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Further, the rule of Narvaez should have a particularly significant
impact on the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits because it addressed an issue that
both of those circuits left open. In Narvaez, the petitioner's sentence was
erroneously increased above the maximum authorized by the USSG. 208 Both
the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits left open the issue of whether the "actual
innocence" exception applies to a sentence that was erroneously enhanced
above the maximum authorized by the USSG.2 09
If either of these Circuits would face the same factual scenario as
Narvaez-a prisoner alleging "actual innocence" of his sentence that was
erroneously increased above the maximum authorized by the USSG-it would
be placed in a tough position. These circuits may be inclined to grant relief to
such a prisoner, but would be hesitant to extend the scope of "actual
innocence." If faced with such a scenario, however, these circuits should be
persuaded by Narvaez because it addressed the issue left open in these circuits,
and reinterpreted the definition of "actual innocence" upon which both of these
circuits relied.
D.

Narvaez Should Apply to ErroneouslyEnhancedA CCA Sentences

Every case previously discussed in this Note dealt exclusively with
sentences that were erroneously enhanced under the USSG. Another type of
sentencing error involves sentences that were erroneously enhanced under the
ACCA. In this situation, a prisoner will use the same avenue of relief as a
prisoner collaterally attacking his erroneously enhanced USSG sentence: 28
U.S.C. § 2255 or 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The issue is whether the "actual innocence"
exception should extend to erroneously enhanced ACCA sentences.
There is a stark contrast between a sentence enhanced under the ACCA
and a sentence enhanced under the USSG. A prisoner's erroneously enhanced
USSG sentence may overlap with his original sentence, as can be seen in
Gilbert and Sun Bear. 210 Thus, it is possible that a prisoner could receive the
exact same sentence even though his Begay-type sentence was erroneously
enhanced. There is no possibility of overlapping sentences with the ACCA.
Under the ACCA, a defendant convicted of an unlawful weapons possession
with three or more prior "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses" will face
a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment and a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment.21 A defendant without these predicate
212
convictions faces a statutory range of zero to ten years imprisonment.
208

Id. at 624.
See supra Parts IV.B.3, IV.C.3.
210
See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2011); Sun Bear,
644 F.3d at 702.
211
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
212
Id. §§ 924(a)(2), (e)(1).
209
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This difference should warrant the extension of Narvaez to erroneously
enhanced ACCA sentences, for three reasons. First, such sentences necessarily
exceed the maximum that would have otherwise been allowed but-for the
erroneous enhancement at the time of sentencing. With the erroneous
enhancement, a prisoner will receive a statutory minimum of fifteen years
imprisonment;213 without the enhancement, a prisoner will receive a statutory
maximum of ten years in prison.2 14 Second, if a prisoner who received an
erroneously enhanced ACCA sentence is resentenced without the enhancement,
the prisoner cannot receive a sentence longer than, or as long as, his original
sentence.215 Third, a prisoner who received an erroneously enhanced ACCA
sentence could not receive the same sentence at his original sentencing.2 16
A recent case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit extended the miscarriage of justice exception to erroneous ACCA
sentences. In Kirk v. United States, 217 the petitioner was convicted of being a
felon in possession of a firearm under the ACCA.218 The maximum sentence
21
for his crime under the ACCA was 120 months imprisonment.219
Petitioner also
had two prior violent felony convictions, and was eligible for a sentence
enhancement under the ACCA; he received a sentenced of 190 months.220
Three years later, Begay was decided and, in light of that decision, one
of Kirk's prior convictions, aggravated vehicular assault, no longer qualified as
a "violent felony" under the ACCA. 22 1 The court granted Kirk's § 2255 motion
to vacate his sentence, and remanded for resentencing.22 2 The Court noted that
Kirk's sentence of 190 months was "well above the 120-month statutory
maximum that would otherwise apply." 2 23 Citing Narvaez, the court concluded
that "[t]his sentence-one 'that the law cannot impose upon [Kirk]'undoubtedly represents a miscarriage of justice, making relief under § 2255
appropriate. ,,224

213

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

214

id

215

217

See id
id.
481 Fed. App'x 249 (6th Cir. 2012).

218

id.

219

Id

220

id
Id The government also conceded that Kirk had only two qualifying violent felonies under

216

221

the ACCA in light of Begay. Id.
222
id
223
Id. (emphasis added).
224
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir.
2009) (citing Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2011))).
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The Seventh Circuit recently discussed the significance of the
distinction between an erroneous ACCA sentence and an erroneous USSG
sentence. In United States v. Wyatt,2 25 the petitioner was convicted, postBooker, of a drug offense under the USSG.22 6 The maximum for his drug
offense was 150 months imprisonment. 2 27 Petitioner also had a prior conviction
of escape from a halfway house, which was a violent felony at the time he was
sentenced. 2 28 Accordingly, petitioner was eligible for a sentence enhancement,
and received 262 months. 229 Subsequently, Begay was decided and, in light of
that decision, petitioner's conviction of escape no longer qualified as a violent
felony under the USSG. Petitioner filed a § 2241 petition alleging that his
erroneously enhanced USSG was "illegal" in light of Begay.230
The court noted that "Wyatt was sentenced at a time when the district
court was aware the guidelines would be considered advisory. In an ACCA
case, a defendant in Wyatt's circumstances could well be entitled to relief
under section 2241.",231 The court concluded that "this is not a statutory case or
an ACCA case; it is a sentencing guidelines case, and it does not appear that, at
this stage, Wyatt is entitled to any relief on collateral review in these
circumstances."23 2
Courts have recognized the difference between ACCA sentences and
USSG sentences in the context of applying the "actual innocence" exception.
Unlike USSG sentences, prisoners with erroneously enhanced ACCA sentences
could not receive the same or a longer sentence upon resentencing because
judges do not have the discretion when imposing ACCA sentences; they are
statutorily imposed. Accordingly, a prisoner whose ACCA sentence was
erroneously enhanced in light of Begay should be able to utilize the "actual
innocence" exception because such a sentence necessarily exceeds the
maximum authorized by law.
VI. NAR VAEZ SHOULD BE UNIVERSALLY ADOPTED
The view taken by the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits-that "actual
innocence" extends to crimes but not sentences-is predicated on the interests

225

672 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2012).

226

id
Id. at 520.

227

Id at 519-20.
Id. at 520.
230
id. at 520-21.
231
Id. at 523-24.
232
Id at 524. Wyatt's § 2255 petition was denied because the Seventh Circuit did not have
jurisdiction over his claim. Id
228

229
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of finality.233 These circuits are worried that if "actual innocence" could be
used to attack erroneous sentences, then it would open the floodgates to endless
filings of habeas petitions, which would destroy the finality interest of § 2255
that Congress intended to protect.234
The Seventh Circuit's approach to "actual innocence" in Narvaez
should be adopted-and the approach taken by the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits should be rejected-for two important reasons. First, both types of
innocence would be remedied; prisoners with Begay-type sentences would be
able to correct their erroneous sentences, just as prisoners who are innocent of
one of their underlying crimes of conviction are able to do. Second, the Seventh
Circuit's approach would not destroy the finality interests of § 2255.
A.

Narvaez Would Remedy Both Types ofInnocence

The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits rely heavily on the distinction
between a prisoner using "actual innocence" to attack his crime versus a
prisoner using "actual innocence" to attack his sentence.23 5 In those circuits,
whether a prisoner's § 2255 or § 2241 claim is granted hinges largely upon this
distinction: a claim alleging innocence of the underlying crime based on a postconviction change in law may be cognizable on collateral review, but a claim
alleging innocence of an erroneous sentence enhancement may not be. 2 36
Consider a statement made by the Eleventh Circuit: "If guidelines
enhancements were crimes, they would have to be charged in the indictment
and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. [Petitioner]'s position turns
on treating sentences as convictions."237
But either way, a prisoner may be serving an erroneous sentence based
on a post-conviction change in law. As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he
Framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept of
liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital instrument to
secure that freedom." 2 38 If prisoners can use habeas corpus to attack their
crimes but not their sentences, are we conceding that habeas corpus is available
to protect against unlawful restraints of liberty, unless it's a sentencing error?
In an impassioned dissent in Gilbert, Circuit Judge James Hill thought so:

Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2011) (refusing to equate
"miscarriage of justice" with every unfair sentence because it would be an "open-ended
expansion" of "actual innocence"); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1309-12 (11th Cir.
2011) (concluding that creating an "actual innocence" exception for sentencing errors would
"wreak havoc on the finality interests that Congress worked so hard to protect").
234
Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 706; Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1309-12.
235 See supra Parts IV.B.2, C.2.
236 See supra Part IV.B.2, C.2.
237
Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1320 (citations omitted).
238
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008).
233
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"[T]he majority appears not to understand that Gilbert's imprisonment-no
matter how his sentence was calculated-is the act of the Sovereign, who is
forbidden by our Constitution to deprive a citizen of his liberty in violation of
the laws of the United States." 23 9 Circuit Judge Beverly Martin, also dissenting
in Gilbert, similarly highlighted the arbitrary distinction between sentencing
claims and claims alleging innocence of the underlying crime: "[T]here is no
relief [in the Eleventh Circuit] for any person who is ... wrongfully
incarcerated on account of a sentencing error. This is so, even here, where that
sentencing error leaves him incarcerated for a decade or more beyond what is

called for by law." 24 0
Judge Hill and Judge Martin correctly pointed out that habeas corpus
should be available to prisoners who are innocent of their underlying crime of
conviction and prisoners whose sentences were erroneously enhanced. In either
situation, prisoners are serving sentences beyond that authorized by law. And in
both situations, habeas corpus relief should be available. As the Narvaez court
pointed out, "to increase, dramatically, the point of departure for [a] sentence is
certainly as serious as the most grievous misinformation that has been the basis
for granting habeas relief." 24 1
B.

Narvaez Would Not Destroy the Finality Interests of§ 2255

The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits' distinction between crimes and
sentences for purposes of "actual innocence" is predicated on the interests of
finality.242 Under this view, the scope of "actual innocence" is confined to
crimes of conviction so that prisoners could not file an endless array of habeas
petitions attacking their sentences.24 3 After all, Congress passed AEDPA "to
further principles of comity, finality, and federalism." 24 4 To ensure finality,
AEDPA placed additional procedural hurdles on § 2255245 that eliminated the
possibility that prisoners could file an endless array of habeas corpus
petitions.24 6 Allowing prisoners to use "actual innocence" to challenge their
sentences in addition to their crimes would, under this view, defeat AEDPA's
purpose. 247 In sum, extending the "actual innocence" exception to include

Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1337 (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1332 (Martin, J., dissenting).
241
Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 2011).
242
See cases cited supra note 233.
243
Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1311.
244
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000).
245
These procedural hurdles include the one-year time limitation and the ban on second and
successive motions. See supra Part III.
239

240

246

See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1311.

247

Id.
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sentencing claims would allow prisoners to circumvent AEDPA's procedural
hurdles by alleging they are "actually innocent" of their sentence.
First, this argument conflates the practicality of reviewing sentences
and convictions. The concerns about comity, finality, and federalism are not as
profound in the review of sentences as in the review of convictions.24 8
Concerns about comity and federalism don't exist when federal courts review a
sentence imposed by a federal district court in a § 2255 proceeding.2 49 Also, a
sentencing error that warrants resentencing is much less time consuming than
conducting a new trial when the prisoner is found to be innocent of his crime.250
The judge will need to read an update to the presentence report and any
additional sentencing memoranda from the parties-the whole process takes no
longer than the original sentencing, "usually less than one hour." 25' If the
conviction is vacated, on the other hand, the entire process starts from the

beginning. 252
Second, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Narvaez,
such a situation is a "special and very narrow exception." 2 53 Such a "narrow
exception" would probably not open up the floodgates to habeas corpus claims
and destroy § 2255's finality interests. The rule of Narvaez would only apply in
very limited circumstances. There must have been a post-conviction change in
law that reinterprets a prisoner's predicate offense(s).2 54 In light of the postconviction change in law, the prisoner's sentence must have been erroneously
increased above the maximum sentence he would have otherwise received.255
Also, in a USSG case, the prisoner would probably have to be sentenced preBooker, when the sentencing judge did not have discretion to deviate from the
guidelines range.2 56 Such a narrow exception would not open the floodgates so
that other prisoners could abuse the "actual innocence" exception. There may
be more habeas filings, but as the dissent in Gilbert pointed out, "if there are
others who are wrongfully detained without a remedy, [courts] should devote

248 Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and CollateralReview,
91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 146 (2012).
249
Id. Comity and federalism concerns arise when federal courts review the judgments of state
courts. Id.; see also Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1334 (Martin, J., dissenting) ("[T]his case does not raise
comity concerns because we are asked to correct a mistake we ourselves made in federal court.
We are not reviewing a state court conviction which would require our deference.").
250 Russell, supra note 248, at 149.
251
Id
252
Id
253
See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 2011).
254

See id.
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256

See supra Part V.B.
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the time and incur the expense to hear their cases. What is the role of courts, if
not this?" 257
The finality argument advanced by the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
also prefers finality over justice. Prisoners with Begay-type sentences received
their erroneous sentences due to the sentencing courts' incorrect interpretation
of sentencing enhancement provisions. Narvaez would remedy this error while
the approach taken by the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits would force these
prisoners to serve out their erroneous sentences under the guise of finality. In
an impassioned dissent, Judge Hill stated in Gilbert that "this court holds that
we may not remedy such a sentence error. This shocking result ... confirms
what I have long feared. The Great Writ is dead in this country." 25 8 He
observed that "[t]hrough our self-imposed limitations, we have found a way to
deny virtually all sentencing claims. We do this, avowedly, in the pursuit of
'finality.' But in so doing, we cast a pall of unconstitutionality over the
otherwise beneficial provisions of § 2255.",259 He concluded by asserting that
finality is no reason to deny relief where the court is obligated to provide it:
I recognize that without finality there can be no justice. But it
is equally true that, without justice, finality is nothing more
than a bureaucratic achievement. . . . Finality with justice is
achieved only when the imprisoned has had a meaningful
opportunity for a reliably judicial determination of his
claim.... A judicial system that values finality over justice is
morally bankrupt. That is why Congress provided in § 2255 an
avenue to relief in circumstances just such as these. For this
court to hold that it is without the power to provide relief to a
citizen that the Sovereign seeks to confine illegally . . . is to

adopt a posture of judicial impotency that is shocking in a
country that has enshrined the Great Writ in its Constitution.260
Finality is essential to our justice system, but it should not be used to
deny relief to prisoners who deserve to be resentenced. The Seventh Circuit's
approach to "actual innocence" in Narvaez would address the finality concerns
that Judge Hill articulates: it extends the scope of "actual innocence" so that
prisoners with Begay-type sentences may have an avenue of relief. Narvaez
also respects the finality interests that the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits value
because it is a narrow exception that is available in limited circumstances.
Whether a prisoner is innocent of his crime or has received an illegal sentence
in light of a post-conviction change in law, under Narvaez he would have a shot
at relief.
257

Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011) (Martin, J., dissenting).

258

Id. (Hill, J., dissenting).

259

id

260

Id at 1337.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Begay, many prisoners
are serving sentences that are clearly erroneous. To remedy this error, a
prisoner will likely have to file either a § 2255 motion or a habeas petition
under § 2241 alleging "actual innocence" of his sentence. The scope of "actual
innocence" in regard to noncapital sentencing is far from settled among the
circuits. This uncertainty is likely to have a devastating effect on prisoners
whose sentences are clearly erroneous and who therefore deserve to be
resentenced. Until the Circuit Courts of Appeals, or the Supreme Court,
develops a uniform approach to "actual innocence" in the noncapital sentencing
context, many federal prisoners may be forced to serve out their clearly
erroneous sentences.
This Note discussed two very different approaches to the scope of
"actual innocence" in the noncapital sentencing context. One approach, taken
by the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, refuses to extend the "actual innocence"
exception to noncapital sentences. This approach is troublesome because it uses
finality as an excuse to deny relief to prisoners whose sentences were enhanced
due to the sentencing court's error. This arbitrary distinction between sentences
and crimes in the "actual innocence" context may force prisoners to serve the
entirety of their erroneous sentences.
The other approach, taken by the Seventh Circuit, would value justice
above finality. It recognizes that erroneously enhanced noncapital sentences
should be remedied and the "actual innocence" exception may be the only
instrument to do so. This approach would eliminate the arbitrary distinction
between prisoners who are innocent of their illegal sentence and prisoners who
are innocent of their crime in the "actual innocence" context, but would not
open the floodgates to excessive habeas corpus appeals, because it is a narrow
exception. The Seventh Circuit's approach would thus ensure that prisoners
would not be punished for alleging the wrong type of innocence.
Greg Siepel*

Senior Notes Editor, Volume 116 of the West Virginia Law Review; J.D. Candidate, West
Virginia University College of Law, May 2014; Bachelor of Arts, Knox College, 2009. The
author thanks Professor Valena Beety for her insight and enthusiasm, my colleagues on the West
Virginia Law Review for their excellent and diligent work, and my friends and family for their
encouragement and support. The author is especially grateful to James Concannon for his advice,
guidance, and eternal patience throughout the writing process. The author is solely responsible
for any errors contained in this Note.
*

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol116/iss2/9

36

